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Homeowners in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics are able to maintain a
high level of consumption following job loss (or disability) in periods of rising local
house prices while the consumption drop for homeowners who lose their job in times
of lower house prices is substantial. These results are consistent with homeowners
being able to access wealth gains when housing appreciates as witnessed by their
ability to smooth consumption more than renters. A calibrated model of endogenous
homeownership and consumption is able to reproduce the patterns in the data quite
well and provides an interpretation of the empirical results.
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Many countries, including the United States, experienced large °uctuations in house prices
over the last decade. For example, house prices increased by 75 percent from 2001 to 2005
in the Providence, R.I., Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), while Los Angeles, on the
opposite coast, saw a gain of 91 percent.1 However, Providence house prices declined by
18 percent from 2006 to 2010, while those of Los Angeles fell even more, by 22 percent. As
housing is the largest asset for most families, such price movements are associated with
large swings in consumers' net worth and it is of ¯rst-order importance to understand the
impact of these °uctuations on consumption.
Homeowners are able to maintain their level of nondurable consumption after income
losses when house prices are increasing, but during deep recessions, such as the subprime
crisis that started in 2007, the drop in consumption can be severe for homeowners who
become displaced or disabled. Our point estimates imply that job displacement for a
homeowner in the Providence MSA would result in a drop in nondurable consumption
during 2006{2010 that is more than 28 percentage points larger over this four-year period
than it would have been during 2001{2005.2 The e®ect of house prices would be even
larger in cities such as Los Angeles and housing depreciation is likely to be a severe drag
on the recovery of the aggregate U.S. economy from the subprime crisis.
The individual-level data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the
focus is to study consumption changes following the onset of disability or job displacement
(arguably exogenous shocks to income). In particular, we investigate households' ability to
maintain|\smooth"|consumption in the face of such shocks, and the empirical focus is
on deviations from countrywide °uctuations, or \risk sharing." Risk sharing is interesting
per se and focusing on risk sharing allows us to abstract from a host of di±cult-to-
control-for aggregate variables that may a®ect consumption. House-price appreciation
arguably provides exogenous shocks to homeowners' wealth and collateral and the main
contribution is to study how risk sharing varies with house-price appreciation by matching
1First quarter data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), formerly known as the O±ce
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
2These numbers are calculated using Table 1, column (2).
1PSID data and house price data at the metropolitan level from the FHFA. The core
empirical result is that homeowners maintain relatively higher (lower) levels of nondurable
consumption after job displacement or disability when house values increase (decrease).
To interpret the ¯ndings, we calibrate and simulate a life-cycle model of households
with preferences for housing (shelter) and nondurable consumption. The model captures
the main features of homeownership|in particular the role of housing as both a con-
sumption good and an asset: homeownership is endogenous and housing services can
be obtained either in the rental market or through homeownership. Households adjust
(nondurable, non-housing) consumption, and possibly housing, in response to income °uc-
tuations although buying or selling a house requires paying a proportional commission.
This makes the e®ect of house price shocks more complicated than the e®ect of liquid
wealth shocks, such as winning the lottery. For homeowners with housing equity above
a minimum down payment, a positive capital gain in housing is fully liquid|although
the household may choose to upgrade to a larger house while paying a proportional com-
mission. Homeowners who own less than the minimum down payment will only be able
to access capital gains in housing if housing appreciation pushes their equity above the
required minimum. In the face of a persistent negative shock to housing, a homeowner
may choose to downsize or move to rental housing|in particular, if the shock happens at
the same time as a persistent income loss.
Panel-data regressions are performed on simulated data in the same fashion as on the
real data and the estimated parameters from the real and simulated data are compared,
and|to the degree that magnitudes match|interpreted. The simulations show that
homeowners maintain consumption better than renters when the relative price of housing
increases.
The model leaves out many real-world complications; nonetheless, the predictions of
the model match the results from the PSID well. We do not attempt to structurally ¯t
the model as Li, Liu and Yao (2009) who have a di®erent focus but use a similar model.
The disadvantage of the present approach, compared with a structural approach, is that
one cannot test the model. The advantage is that the empirical ¯ndings are robust to
2many forms of model misspeci¯cation.
Related work has attempted to measure the direct impact of housing appreciation
on consumption|typically under the label of \wealth e®ects." Because national house
prices correlate with economic conditions in general, the quanti¯cation of the e®ect of
house prices on consumption remains controversial. The most promising avenue seems to
be regressions that rely on regional house prices as pioneered by Attanasio and Weber
(1994)|such regressions allow for control of nationwide e®ects. Further, these authors
simulate a theoretical model to evaluate the plausibility of their empirical estimates. Two
papers in that vein are Campbell and Cocco (2007), who ¯nd evidence of a wealth e®ect,
and Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton and Leicester (2009), who argue that common causality is
a more likely explanation for the patterns of consumption and house-price growth in the
United Kingdom. Like these authors, this article uses regional house prices and compares
renters to owners, and young households to old households.
Several other papers are related to the present article: Hurst and Sta®ord (2004)
document that house equity is used as a mechanism to smooth income shocks due to un-
employment. Their empirical focus is on the decision to re¯nance while this work directly
considers consumption. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) ¯nd more risk sharing be-
tween U.S. metropolitan areas in periods when average U.S. house-price appreciation is
high.3 Chetty and Szeidl (2007) study consumption patterns when a part of wealth is
\committed" and cannot be easily adjusted as is the case for our consumers in the sense
that it is costly to adjust housing consumption. Finally, Leth-Petersen (2010) considers
the e®ect of increasing the ability to use housing as collateral by studying the e®ect of an
exogenous relaxation of home-equity lending restrictions in Denmark.
The empirical strategy is described in Section 2 while the data and empirical es-
timations are presented in Section 3. The theoretical model and its implications are in
Section 4 while Section 5 reports the results of regressions using simulated data. Section 6
concludes.
3Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) consider the role of housing collateral in a general equilibrium
model with state-contingent claims. However, they use U.S. regional data and do not consider renters
versus homeowners.
32 Regression speci¯cation
In an endowment economy with one nondurable good and complete Arrow-Debreu mar-
kets, all consumers will have identical consumption growth rates if they have identi-
cal constant relative risk aversion preferences. Mace (1991) tests this prediction in a
panel-data regression of consumption on income with controls for aggregate e®ects while
Cochrane (1991) examines whether consumers are fully hedged against job loss. Let
zit = logZit¡logZit¡4 be the growth rate of a generic variable Z, such as consumption C,
of individual i from year t¡4 to t, and let ¹ zt be the period t speci¯c mean of any generic
variable z. Let hpmt be the four-year growth rate of house prices in the metropolitan
area m where individual i lives and let Dit be a dummy taking the value 1 if the head of
household i su®ers displacement and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, Dit is an indicator that
takes the value 1 at the onset of disability, {1 if the household head exits from disability,
and 0 otherwise. Pooling data from regions with di®erent house-price appreciation, the
impact of job loss (disability) on consumption and the risk-sharing role of housing in the
face of job displacement (disability) is evaluated by estimating the relation
cit ¡ ¹ ct = ¹ + ¯ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + » (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) + ³ (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + (Xit ¡ ¹ Xt)0± + "it ;
(1)
where Xit is a vector of controls (age, the square of age, and family size). The time-
speci¯c mean is subtracted from all variables because the subtraction of the aggregate
non-diversi¯able component gives all estimated coe±cients the interpretation of showing
deviations from perfect risk sharing. In particular, by subtracting hpt from hpmt, the
nationwide average house-price appreciation is removed from the time-varying coe±cient.
The time-series variation in average house prices is likely correlated with other aggre-
gate variables, such as stock market performance, and we want to hedge against house
prices capturing such variables. Here, the derivative of idiosyncratic consumption growth
with respect to a disability (displacement) shock is » + ³(hpmt ¡ hpt), which would be 0
under perfect risk sharing. When these coe±cients are not 0, a positive coe±cient of ³
4implies that house-price appreciation dampens the e®ect of displacement on consumption
growth|that is, risk sharing goes up with house-price appreciation. The regressions are
similar to those of Cochrane (1991) with a house-price interaction added.4 Brie°y, under
full insurance of nondurable consumption and housing services, deviations of idiosyncratic
consumption growth from the nationwide average should be orthogonal to idiosyncratic
shocks to income such as disability or displacement. This should also be true for the
interaction term of idiosyncratic income shocks with regional house-price growth, assum-
ing house prices are uncorrelated with measurement error in consumption and shocks to
the relative taste for consumption of nondurables and housing services. That is, under
the null of full insurance, the coe±cients ¯, », and ³ should be equal to zero. If, how-
ever, risks to nondurable consumption are shared nationally but risks to consumption
of housing services are shared only within a region, only ^ » and ^ ³ should be statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
See Appendix A for more detailed interpretation of equation (1).5
3 Empirical estimations
Individual- and household-level data is from the PSID, which is a longitudinal study of
U.S. households, and this section provides a brief description of the estimation sample.6
The PSID maintains Geocode Match Files, which contain identi¯ers necessary to link
the main PSID data to Census data allowing for adding data on characteristics of each
respondent's neighborhood to the already rich array of socioeconomic variables collected
in the PSID.7 Households are matched to their MSA of residence and house-price appre-
ciation is at the metropolitan level.
4Cochrane (1991) estimates cross-sectional regressions but panel data regressions with time ¯xed
e®ects can be seen as weighted averages of cross-sections. Cochrane's de¯nition of involuntary job-loss
is essentially the same as the present de¯nition of \displaced" and the regressions con¯rm his results.
(Cochrane (1991) also leaves out income.)
5Appendices with supplemental material are available on Science Direct.
6For more details on sample selection, see Appendix B.
7The Geocode Match data is highly sensitive (usually pinpointing the census tract in which families
live), and is available only under special contractual conditions designed to protect the anonymity of
respondents.
5Food consumption is used as the measure of consumption because of a lack of broader
consumption aggregate, although results are also shown for imputed nondurable con-
sumption. Food consumption consists of food consumed at home and away from home
(excluding food purchased at work or school). Household income is the sum of real labor
and transfer income of head and wife before taxes. Food consumption at home and away
from home and household income are de°ated by the all-items-less-housing consumer price
index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A household head is considered displaced if the head's \previous company folded or
changed hands or moved out of town; employer died, went out of business," because
of \strike, lockout," or because the head was \laid o®/¯red."8 The disability variable is
constructed from two questions typically referred to as \limiting conditions."9 The ¯rst
asks: \Do you (head) have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work
or amount of work you can do?" The second question asks: \How much does it limit
your work?" The head is considered to be disabled if he or she answers yes to the ¯rst
question and states \can do nothing" or indicates that disability limits the ability to work
somewhat or a lot.
Because food consumption is imprecisely measured at the annual frequency, four-year
(overlapping) growth rates are used. This choice reduces measurement error and averages
out temporary °uctuations in income and consumption. Economists typically agree that
longer-lasting (\permanent") shocks matter more for welfare, so little is lost by looking
at the longer frequencies where permanent shocks are relatively more important.10
In the regressions, the disability variable enters as 0 if there was no change in the
disability status from period t ¡ 4 to t, as 1 if the head reports disability at t but not at
t ¡ 4, and as {1 if the head reports disability at t ¡ 4 but not at t. The displacement
variable enters as 1 if the head reports being displaced in year t ¡ 3, t ¡ 2, t ¡ 1, or t.
When presenting results by housing tenure status, a homeowner (renter) is a household
8The PSID did not collect information on displacement during the 1994{1997 waves.
9In 1973, 1974, and 1975, only new heads were asked these questions. In cases where the answer in
one of those years is missing, the value is imputed using the answer from a preceding year.
10Cochrane (1991) uses three-year growth rates, similar to our frequency. An even number of years is
used here to match up with the biennial sampling frequency initiated by the PSID in 1997.
6that owned a house (rented) in all periods involved in calculating the consumption growth
rate.
The analysis is restricted to families with stable composition (same head and wife
during the four-year span), whose head of household is of prime age (25{65) with infor-
mation on housing status and region of residence during the four-year span. The Latino
and Immigrant samples of the PSID are excluded but households from the representative
core sample and the Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO), the sub-sample of low
income households, are included. The sample is also restricted to households that reside
in the same metropolitan area during a given four-year period so they can meaningfully
be assigned four-year MSA house-price changes|households that move within the MSA
remain in the sample.
Total (imputed) nondurable consumption. Consumer research typically focuses on the
response of total nondurable consumption and Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008)
impute nondurable consumption of PSID households in a study of consumption and in-
come inequality. Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) for 1980{1992, these authors estimate a structural equation for food con-
sumption as a function of nondurable consumption and demographics and invert the
estimated equation to obtain a measure of nondurable consumption for PSID households.
We follow their imputation strategy using extracts of the CEX for 1980{2002 from the
NBER.
In the CEX, households report at most four quarterly observations on consumption
components and only households that respond in all four quarters are included. If con-
sumption is recorded in years t and t+1, annual consumption is assumed to refer to year t
if that year contains at least six months of records and to year t+1 otherwise.11 The ¯nal
CEX sample consists of households with heads 25{65 years old and born between 1915
and 1978. Nondurable consumption is the sum of annual expenditures on food, alcohol
11In the PSID, males are considered household heads, while in the CEX the head is the person who
rents or owns the residential unit. To make the de¯nitions of heads compatible, the male is assigned to
be the head for CEX couples. Households whose heads are part-time or full-time college students are
dropped. As for the PSID sample, observations with zero or missing records for food consumption at
home are dropped and the annual distribution of total food is trimmed at the 1st and the 99th percentiles.
7and tobacco, clothes and personal care, domestic services, transportation, entertainment,
gambling and charity, and utilities.12
House-price appreciation. MSA house-prices are from the FHFA, which reports quar-
terly house-price indices for single-family detached properties.13 Merging FHFA data
with PSID data results in a sample that covers 1976{2005. The overall (four-year) mean
house-price appreciation is 6 percent, with a 19 percent standard deviation while me-
dian house-price appreciation is lower at 4 percent. There is rich variation across MSAs
and over time during this period. Three of the MSAs with lowest house-price appreci-
ation during the period are Binghamton, Houston, and New Orleans, which have mean
(standard deviation) appreciation of {7.7 (13.5), {5.7 (14.5), and {3.3 (13.4) percent, re-
spectively. Three of the MSAs with the highest house-price appreciation are the Boston,
San Francisco, and New York City areas, at 15.3 (28.2), 14.7 (22.9), and 11.5 (24.5),
respectively.14
3.1 Estimation results
The regressions described in Section 2 are estimated using a two-stage Prais-Winsten GLS
procedure, which is e±cient in the case of ¯rst-order autocorrelation; the observations are
overlapping and therefore, by construction, autocorrelated.15 The standard errors are
calculated using robust clustering at the MSA level.
12Table A-3 reports the results of an IV-regression of food consumption on nondurable consumption,
demographic controls, and prices. In an OLS setting, the estimated elasticities may be biased because
of measurement error in nondurable consumption and because of endogeneity of food and nondurable
consumption. The regressions follow Blundell et al. (2008) and instrument log-nondurable consumption
(and its interactions with year and education dummies) with the head's sex-education-year-cohort speci¯c
averages of log hourly wages (and their interactions with year and education dummies). The estimated
coe±cients in Table A-3 are used to impute nondurable (non-housing) consumption to PSID households
for 1980{2002.
13The agency bases these reports on data on conventional conforming mortgage transactions obtained
from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae). The house-price indices are based on the methodology proposed by Case and
Shiller (1989) de°ated by the all-items-less-housing CPI. The index for each geographic area is estimated
using repeated observations of housing values for individual single-family residential properties on which
at least two mortgages were purchased or securitized by either Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae since January
1975.
14See Appendix C for more details.
15The data will have autocorrelation of order higher than one but typically most e±ciency gains are
obtained as long as ¯rst-order correlation is allowed for.
8The range of four-year log di®erences of consumption is between {1.8 and 1.7, while
that of income is even larger. House prices also show large deviations from the U.S. mean.
On average, about 12 percent of the sample receives a displacement shock during a four-
year time span, while 5 percent su®ers from a limiting condition and 3 percent recovers
from one.16
Table 1 shows results for owners, renters, and the pooled sample. Disability and
displacement are ¯rst considered separately and then combined into a variable called
\bad news." Bad news is a dummy variable that equals one if a household head becomes
either displaced or disabled (or both). The results for homeowners in columns (1) and
(2) indicate that the main e®ect of disability or displacement is similar with a drop in
nondurable consumption of about 4 percent. The direct impact of house-price appreciation
is robustly estimated at about 13 percent for owners. The interaction of house prices with
disability is very large, estimated at about 0.33, while the interaction with displacement
is about 0.16. In the regression using bad news|column (3)|the main e®ect of bad
news is {0.05 while the interaction term is 0.18. These numbers imply that nondurable
consumption drops by about 5 percent when the household head becomes disabled or
displaced in the absence of house-price appreciation but if house prices appreciate by 10
percent over the relevant four-year span, the drop in nondurable consumption is only
about 3 percent (ignoring the main e®ect of house-price appreciation).
For renters, there is a large direct e®ect of house prices which likely is due to house
prices being correlated with components of income or with expectations of future income.
The interaction of disability and displacement with house-price growth is negative for
renters with a larger (although insigni¯cant) coe±cient for disability. The direct e®ect of
disability is estimated at {0.06, and the direct e®ect of displacement at {0.08. Combining
these into bad news we ¯nd a coe±cient of {0.07 while the interaction term becomes very
close to 0|the variable \bad news" delivers less noisy results and, in the following, we
use this variable only. The last column shows the results for a combined sample of owners
and renters and the results are in-between those found for each of these samples.
16See (appendix) Table A-1.
9Table 2 explores di®erent samples and speci¯cations in order to explore robustness
and add to our understanding. Only the direct e®ects of house price growth, bad news,
and their interaction are presented to conserve space. The table includes a column for
owners and one for renters and, for convenience, repeats the results of Table 1 as the
¯rst entry. The second entry limits the sample to households that did not move during
each four-year period. This addresses the issue of whether the results are mainly due to
households freeing up home equity by downsizing their residence after being hit by a bad
news shock. However, the results are similar to the baseline case and the insurance e®ect
of house-price appreciation is therefore not mainly a result of downsizing. The results are
also robust to using non-overlapping intervals although the interaction terms are large for
both owners and renters, yet not signi¯cant for renters. The non-overlapping regressions
are clearly estimated with less precision.
The large coe±cient to house-price appreciation for renters is puzzling. Household
income may contain a regional component correlating with house-price growth and an
attempt was made to extract the component of house-price appreciation orthogonal to
income by regressing house-price appreciation on average income growth in the MSA
and using the residuals as our measure of house-price appreciation.17 This lowers the
estimated coe±cient to house-price appreciation slightly for renters but does not change
the coe±cients of any variable strongly. These results highlight how careful one needs
to be in interpreting aggregate correlations between appreciation of house values and
nondurable consumption as causal. The next two sets of results consider young and
old households, respectively. Consumption of young renters reacts positively to house-
price appreciation consistent with a correlation of house-price appreciation with income
expectations; however, the interaction term is insigni¯cant for young owners as well as
renters. Older individuals are hit harder by bad news. Old owners and, in particular, old
renters react less strongly to house-price appreciation while the interaction term is highly
signi¯cant for older owners only. The latter result may re°ect that older homeowners,
on average, have a larger amount of accumulated housing equity that helps them insure
17MSA income is per capita real income received by all persons from all sources and is available from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
10nondurable consumption.
Table 3 presents further robustness results. The interaction e®ect may be due to
changes in house prices tightening or loosening credit constraints. Poorer households
may be subject to tighter credit constraints and households in the SEO sample, the
subsample of low-income households, may have larger interaction terms than individuals
in the representative core sample. The interaction term is slightly larger for the SEO
sample but the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant.18
Table 3 further shows two sets of results for the sample split into an early period 1980{
1994 and a later period 1994{2005.19 This split results in a similar number of observations
for the two subsamples. If ¯nancial liberalization and higher use of home-equity lines of
credit made housing equity easier to access one would expect to ¯nd more consumption
insurance in the latter sample. However, the results are very robust to the sample period.
Likely, people with liquid life-cycle savings were able to draw on those in the early sample,
possibly by taking out a second mortgage.
The results for owners, when using imputed nondurable consumption, are virtually
identical to the results using food consumption. For renters, the estimated impact of
house-price appreciation is even larger with this measure and so is the interaction term,
but the coe±cient for the interaction is still nowhere near signi¯cant statistically. While
imputed nondurable consumption is surely imperfect, these results do not point to the
¯ndings being spurious due to the food-only consumption measure.
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 3 displays results where income is included as
a regressor. As expected, the coe±cient to bad news becomes slightly smaller because
part of the impact is captured by income, but the reduction is not large|likely because
18Further, the interaction term is higher for SEO households with low home equity relative to con-
sumption which is consistent with this group having to adjust consumption more in the case of bad news
and negative shocks to house prices. The role of home equity is explored in more detail following the
presentation of the model.
19The disability indicator is used instead of bad news because information on disability was collected
consistently throughout the sample period while information on displacement, used for constructing the
bad news indicator, was not collected during 1994{1997. Using bad news instead delivers qualitatively
similar estimates: for the 1980{1994 sample the interaction term is estimated at about 0.19, signi¯cant at
the 5 percent level, while the interaction term for the 1994{2005 sample is about 0.20, nearly signi¯cant
at the 10 percent level.
11income shocks are partly transitory and partly persistent while the bad news shocks are
overwhelmingly persistent and not well captured by measured income.
4 The model and calibration
To interpret the results, we introduce a model and perform similar regressions using
simulated data.
4.1 The model
An important feature of the model is that homeownership is a choice for households (i.e.,
an endogenous tenure choice). As in D¶ ³az and Luengo-Prado (2008) households have
¯nite life-spans and derive utility from consumption of a nondurable good and housing
services that can be obtained in a rental market or through homeownership. House
buyers pay a down payment, buyers and sellers pay transactions costs, and housing equity
above a required down payment can be used as collateral for loans. There are no other
forms of credit. Tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is preferential as in the United
States. Households face uninsurable earning risk and uncertainty arising from house-price
variation.
Preferences, endowments, and demography. Households live for up to T periods and face
an exogenous probability of dying each period. During the ¯rst R periods of life they
receive stochastic labor earnings and from period R on they receive a pension. When a
household dies, it is replaced by a newborn and its wealth is passed on as an accidental
bequest. Houses are liquidated at death; thus, newborns receive only liquid assets.
Households derive utility from nondurable goods and from housing services obtained
from either renting or owning a home. One unit of housing stock provides one unit of
housing services. The per-period utility of an individual of age t born in period 0 is
U (Ct;Jt) where C stands for nondurable consumption and J denotes housing services.
Households cannot rent and own a home at the same time. The expected lifetime utility




(1+½)t ³tU (Ct;Jt), where ½ ¸ 0 is the time
12discount rate and ³t is the probability of being alive at age t.
Market arrangements. A household starts period t with a stock of residential assets,
Ht¡1 ¸ 0, deposits, At¡1 ¸ 0, and collateral debt (mortgage debt and home-equity loans),
Mt¡1 ¸ 0. Deposits earn a return ra and the interest on debt is rm. A house bought
in period t renders services from the beginning of the period. The price of one unit of
housing stock (in terms of nondurable consumption) is qt, while the rental price of one
unit of housing stock is r
f
t .
When buying a house, households must make a down payment µqtHt.20 Therefore, a
new mortgage must satisfy the condition Mt · (1¡µ)qt Ht: For homeowners who do not
move in a given period, houses serve as collateral for loans (home-equity loans) with a
maximum loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of (1 ¡ µ).
If house prices go down, a homeowner can simply service debt if he or she is not
moving; i.e., as long as the homeowner stays in the same house, Mt could be higher than
(1 ¡ µ)qt Ht if Mt < Mt¡1. Foreclosure is not allowed so a homeowner can be \upside-
down" (have negative housing equity) for as many periods as the household desires.21
Households pay a fraction · of the house value when buying a house (e.g., sales tax
or search costs). When selling a house, a homeowner loses a fraction Â of the house value
(brokerage fees). Houses depreciate at the rate ±h and households can choose the degree
of maintenance. Buying and selling costs are paid if jHt=Ht¡1¡1j > 0:05 which indicates
that only homeowners upsizing or downsizing housing services by more than 5 percent
pay adjustment costs.
Households sell their houses for various reasons. First, households may want to increase
or downsize housing consumption throughout the life cycle. Second, selling the house is
the only way to realize capital gains beyond the maximum LTV for home-equity loans so
20There are no income requirements for people purchasing houses. Many lenders follow the rule of
thumb of \three times income" in determining the size of mortgages. However, the empirical literature
¯nds that wealth constraints are more important than income constraints when people purchase a home.
See, for example, Linneman, Megbolugbe, Watcher and Cho (1997) or Quercia, McCarthy and Watcher
(2000).
21These assumptions simplify the computation of the model while allowing us to consider both down-
payment requirements and home-equity loans without modeling speci¯c mortgage contracts. See Li and
Yao (2007) for an alternative model with re¯nancing costs and Campbell and Cocco (2003) for a discussion
of optimal mortgage choice.
13households may sell the house to prop up nondurable consumption after depleting their
deposits and maxing out home-equity loans. Third, households may also be forced to
sell their houses as they are subject to an idiosyncratic moving shock, zt. This shock is
meant to capture the e®ect of \geographical" mobility stemming from job change and
demographic shocks are not modeled for simplicity.
The government. The government taxes income, Y , at the rate ¿y. Imputed housing rents
for homeowners are tax-free and interest payments are tax deductible with a deduction
percentage ¿m so taxable income in period t is Y ¿
t = Yt ¡ ¿m rm Mt¡1. Proceeds from
taxation ¯nance government expenditures that do not a®ect individuals at the margin.
Earnings and house-price uncertainty. Households are subject to household-speci¯c risk in
labor earnings and house-price risk common to residents of the same region. For working-
age households, labor earnings, Wt, are the product of permanent income and transitory
shocks (Pt, ºt, and Át, respectively): Wt = PtºtÁt. ºt is an idiosyncratic transitory
shock with logºt » N (¡¾2
º=2;¾2
º) while Át is a transitory displacement/disability (\bad")
shock which reduces income by a proportion ¹ with a small probability pÁ. In turn,
permanent income is Pt = Pt¡1°t²t&t. Thus, permanent income growth, ¢logPt, is the
sum of a non-stochastic life-cycle component, log°t, an idiosyncratic permanent shock,
log²t » N (¡¾2
²=2;¾2
²), and an additional permanent \bad" shock log&t, which reduces
permanent income by the proportion ¸t with a small probability p&. ¸t is allowed to vary
with age, the cut being more drastic for older households.22 Retirees receive a pension
proportional to permanent earnings in the last period of their working life. That is, for a
household born at time 0, Wt = bPR; 8t > R.23
House prices are uncertain and, following Li and Yao (2007), house-price appreciation
is assumed to be an i.i.d. normal process: qt=qt¡1 ¡ 1 = %t, with %t » N(¹%;¾2
%). This
speci¯cation implies that house-price shocks are permanent.24 In the benchmark cali-
22The combination of permanent and transitory bad shocks is meant to capture employment and/or
disability shocks that may or may not a®ect income for more than one period and may a®ect households
di®erently.
23This simpli¯cation is required for computational reasons and is common in the literature. See, for
example, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005).
24This assumption is common in the literature (e.g., Cocco 2005, Campbell and Cocco 2003), and greatly
simpli¯es the computation of the model by facilitating a renormalization of the household problem with
fewer state variables.
14bration, these shocks are serially uncorrelated and not correlated with household labor
earnings.
4.2 Calibration
The calibration is constructed to reproduce three statistics from the Survey of Consumer
Finances: the homeownership rate, the median wealth-to-earnings ratio for working-age
households, and the median ratio of home value to total wealth for homeowners (70
percent, 1.80, and 0.82, respectively).
To match the targets, the discount rate is set to 3.45 percent, the weight of housing in
a Cobb-Douglas utility function to 0.2, and the minimum house-size that consumers can
purchase is 1.65 times permanent income. The general strategy in choosing the remaining
parameters is to focus whenever possible on empirical evidence for the median household.25
5 Regression results from simulated data
Simulations are performed for 27 \regions" with 5,000 people each for a number of peri-
ods. House-price shocks are common to all individuals in a given region (there are only
three possible house-price shocks) while all other shocks (income and moving shocks) are
idiosyncratic. In regions 1 through 9, the house-price shock is at the lowest value for the
last four periods (house-price depreciation). In regions 10 through 18, the house-price
shock is at the middle value (constant house prices), while in regions 19 through 27, the
house-price shock is at the highest value (house-price appreciation). Simulated data from
the last ¯ve periods (which represent 10 years, as one period in our model corresponds to
two years) is used in these regressions.26
To match the speci¯cation in the empirical section, four-year log di®erences in con-
sumption, income, and house prices, and overlapping growth rates are used in the regres-
sions. The bad news dummy equals 1 in period t if the household su®ers a bad shock in
periods t, t ¡ 1, t ¡ 2, or t ¡ 3 and not in t ¡ 4. As in the data, when presenting results
25See Appendix D for details and Table 4 for parameter values.
26Results are similar if more periods are included in the regressions.
15by tenure status, a homeowner (renter) is a household that owned (rented) a house in all
periods involved in calculating the consumption growth rate. To facilitate comparisons
with the empirical results, regressions are estimated using households with heads aged
28{64.27
Table 5, ¯rst panel, shows that 10 percent house-price appreciation results in a 2.7
percent increase in nondurable consumption for owners with no e®ect for renters. The
direct e®ect of bad news is a drop in nondurable consumption of 17 percent for owners
versus 21 percent for renters. The coe±cients are estimated very precisely|the t-statistics
are much larger than those in the data which re°ects that the model is a simpli¯cation
where all consumers are a priori identical. Importantly, the sensitivity of consumption to
bad news goes down when houses appreciate as shown by the estimated positive coe±cient
for the interaction term. Nondurable consumption drops by about a percentage point less
if housing appreciates by 10 percent. Compared to the data, the coe±cient to house prices
is larger, maybe re°ecting higher costs or more stringent ¯nancing constraints for some
households in the real world. The e®ect of bad news is smaller in the real world |maybe
re°ecting informal help from family (who may live in the same MSA) or assets not present
in the model|while the interaction is smaller in the model.
The other panels in Table 5 explore the properties of the theoretical model in order to
understand the impact of relative house prices, ¯nancing constraints, etc. on the results.
The second panel shows the results for the case with no homeownership and \house prices"
simply capture changes in rental prices. In this case, house-price changes do not a®ect
nondurable consumption directly or through the interaction with the bad-news shock.
This set of results veri¯es that the ¯ndings regarding house prices are not due to changes
in relative prices per se which, of course, re°ects the speci¯c utility function used.28
The next set of results analyzes a model where homeownership can be obtained with
no down payment. In this case, the barriers to home ownership are a minimum required
27As explained in Appendix D, households are born at age 24 and retire at age 66.
28The within-period preferences for consumption of nondurables and housing services are Cobb-
Douglas. Thus, in a perfect rental market setting, consumers keep ¯xed proportions of their spending on
each type of good: if house prices go up, real consumption of housing services goes down but nondurable
consumption remains unchanged.
16size of the house and the potential trading costs if the house has to be sold again. These
results are quite similar to the benchmark case, although the interaction e®ect is slightly
larger because a larger fraction of home equity can be used as collateral for loans. If,
alternatively, there is a down payment but no transaction costs, the interaction term gets
somewhat smaller as homeowners can easily downsize making home equity completely
liquid|talking about collateral in this case is purely semantics. The direct e®ect of bad
news for renters is larger because they are less a²uent in this simulation. Interestingly,
there is a signi¯cant e®ect of house prices for renters. This e®ect can, for example, be due
to older renters giving up on accumulating enough savings for a down payment and using
part of their accumulated savings for nondurable consumption. The negative signi¯cant
interaction could be due to young renters saving for a down payment.
If there is no down payment, adjustment costs, or minimum house size requirement,
house equity is fully liquid for all owners and the insurance e®ect measured by the inter-
action terms takes its largest value across the simulations. It appears that the liquidity
of house equity is important for the direct e®ect of house prices: if housing consumption
cannot be easily adjusted, nondurable consumption reacts more strongly. The interaction
e®ect is, however, larger when housing can be freely adjusted.
In the situation with a down payment of 100 percent, home equity is, in principle, not
liquid and the interaction term becomes smaller. It is, however, still highly signi¯cant due
to owners that have paid o® their full mortgage. For such owners, an increase in house
prices is associated with an increase in life-cycle savings as most owners will eventually
sell the house and they are therefore willing to draw on their liquid (non-housing) wealth.
Finally, house-price growth is allowed to be perfectly correlated with income growth|
in this case the direct e®ect of house prices is highly signi¯cant for renters but the inter-
action e®ect is not. Because it is very hard to properly control for correlations between
house prices and income, testing for insurance e®ects of house prices is more robust than
testing for direct e®ects of house-prices.
Table 6 summarizes the model's predictions when the sample is split by criteria similar
to the splits used for the PSID data. The ¯rst panel shows that nondurable consumption
17reacts more strongly to house-price changes for non-movers. As in the empirical part,
households are classi¯ed as young if the head is below 45 and old if above 50. As in
the data, the e®ect of house-price appreciation on consumption (in the direction of more
risk sharing) is strongest for old owners. Older owners have more equity and, likely more
important, may be more willing to pay the adjustment cost because they plan to downsize
to free up life-cycle savings anyway. The model results, however, do not display the very
large di®erence between young and old found in the data. The signi¯cant interaction for
old renters is likely due to some renters giving up on accumulating enough assets to ever
obtain a house, which frees up the savings originally intended for a down payment.
The sample is further split according to net worth. The interaction term is larger
for homeowners with low net worth|such households may only be able to access home
equity by downsizing the residence (or moving to rental) but this involves transactions
costs which may be hard to meet if the household is under water.29 I.e., wealth may be
e®ectively more \committed" for households with less wealth and this may be particularly
important when bad news happen at a time of declining house prices. This result is
consistent with the larger coe±cients found for the SEO sample in the empirical section.
The last panel reports results controlling for income growth. We ¯nd a signi¯cantly higher
propensity to consume out of income for renters pointing towards less overall risk sharing
for this group. Controlling for income also brings the coe±cient to the direct e®ect of
bad news closer to its empirical counterpart, while having little e®ect on the interaction
coe±cients.
Finally, Table 7 examines the role of self-reported home equity|combining empiri-
cal results (in the left-most columns) and results from simulated data (in the right-most
columns). We display results where the sample, for young and old separately, is split
into households with initial high/low housing equity relative to consumption (the lat-
ter is averaged over the previous four years). The table con¯rms that older individuals
smooth income losses due to bad news better than younger individuals and this result|
particularly in the data but also in the model|is much stronger for households with large
29Moving rates are much lower for households with low liquid wealth when displaced, particularly when
houses depreciate (these results are not tabulated due to space constraints).
18amounts of housing equity relative to their level of consumption. This ¯nding is fairly
intuitive and highlights that the results for age splits likely are partly due to the life-cycle
and not only due to an e®ect of older individuals holding more liquid equity.30
6 Conclusion
In a calibrated theoretical model in which agents can own or rent, homeowners are better
able to share income risks than renters. This result corresponds to the empirical ¯nding
that U.S. households are signi¯cantly better able to maintain their level of consumption
after job loss or disability if they are homeowners in MSAs where housing is appreciating.
Our interpretation is that this results from homeowners being able to access capital gains
either using equity as collateral or by selling the house|although the results indicate that
downsizing is not the primary channel.
The estimated coe±cients are of economically signi¯cant magnitudes. Ignoring the
direct e®ect of house prices (which is likely to partly re°ect left-out variables, such as
expectations of future income), the empirical estimates imply that a homeowner who
becomes disabled will see a drop in consumption of about 5 percent over a four-year
period if house prices are constant but no change in consumption if house prices in the
metro area increase by about 26 percent during the same time period. However, if house
prices fall by, say, 40 percent|as is not uncommon in the wake of the 2008 subprime
crisis|a staggering consumption drop of 12 percent can be expected for a homeowner
who becomes disabled.31
30A previous version of the paper explored if the results were capturing di®erences in household liquid
wealth by splitting the sample by ¯nancial assets. The interactions of displacement and disability with
house-price growth were found insigni¯cant for renters of all wealth levels which indicates that the house-
price variable is not standing in for di®erences in wealth. Those results were based on a limited sample
because the PSID started collecting wealth data only in 1984, available at 5-year intervals up to 1999,
and biennially afterwards. The sample requirement of household stability further limits the ability of
getting reliable results using wealth data so those results are not tabulated.
31This illustration is based on the coe±cients in column (3) of Table 1 ignoring the direct e®ect of
house-price appreciation.
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21Table 1: Risk Sharing Regressions for Owners vs. Renters
Owners Renters All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
House price growth 0.129*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.213*** 0.152***
(5.55) (5.69) (5.79) (4.86) (4.89) (4.84) (8.05)
Disabled {0.043*** {0.062***
({4.06) ({3.12)




Displaced £ house price gr. 0.156** {0.082
(1.98) ({0.62)
Bad news {0.047*** {0.070*** {0.060***
({4.66) ({4.10) ({7.48)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.184*** 0.012 0.119**
(2.62) (0.11) (2.55)
Family size growth 0.336*** 0.338*** 0.335*** 0.266*** 0.273*** 0.266*** 0.308***
(23.51) (23.41) (23.57) (15.91) (16.64) (16.01) (27.92)
Age {0.009*** {0.009*** {0.009*** {0.005 {0.006 {0.005 {0.006**
({2.95) ({2.90) ({3.02) ({0.87) ({1.06) ({0.94) ({2.32)
Age sq./100 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(1.48) (1.43) (1.54) (0.34) (0.46) (0.37) (0.73)
Adj. R sq. 0.078 0.077 0.078 0.037 0.040 0.038 0.059
F 200.0 157.4 188.0 49.6 77.5 71.8 221.5
N 19,230 18,227 19,234 8,778 8,436 8,778 32,254
Notes: Sample is restricted to owners and renters de¯ned as follows. Owners (renters) are households who
continuously owned (rented) a house between years t and t ¡ 4, resided in the same MSA and did not change
family composition during that time span. Serial correlation in the regression errors is corrected using the Prais-
Winsten transformation; robust standard errors in the regressions clustered by the MSA where the household
lives between years t and t ¡ 4. t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) [*] signi¯cant at the 1 (5) [10]% level.
22Table 2: Risk sharing regressions|Data. Different samples
Owners Renters
Main speci¯cation
House price growth 0.133*** (5.79) 0.213*** (4.84)
Bad news {0.047*** ({4.66) {0.070*** ({4.10)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.184*** (2.62) 0.012 (0.11)
No. of obs. 19,234 8,778
Non-movers/same residence
House price growth 0.130*** (5.59) 0.174** (2.42)
Bad news {0.042*** ({3.76) {0.067*** ({3.05)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.172** (2.31) 0.098 (0.58)
No. of obs. 16,577 4,343
Non-overlapping growth rates
House price growth 0.124*** (2.74) 0.212* (1.85)
Bad news {0.079*** ({4.95) {0.083*** ({3.44)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.356*** (3.03) 0.250 (1.51)
No. of obs. 6,251 2,771
House-price residuals
House price growth 0.098*** (3.60) 0.180*** (3.92)
Bad news {0.048*** ({4.78) {0.070*** ({4.17)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.180** (2.20) 0.051 (0.41)
No. of obs. 19,234 8,778
Young
House price growth 0.134*** (4.19) 0.244*** (3.99)
Bad news {0.045*** ({3.01) {0.056*** ({2.99)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.045 (0.51) {0.036 ({0.28)
No. of obs. 8,839 5,582
Old
House price growth 0.124*** (4.15) 0.141 (1.64)
Bad news {0.059*** ({4.62) {0.113*** ({3.55)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.304*** (3.05) 0.093 (0.43)
No. of obs. 7,854 2,383
Notes: The following regression is estimated: cit ¡ ¹ ct = ¹ + ¯ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + » (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) + ³ (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) £ (hpmt ¡
hpt) + (Xit ¡ ¹ Xt)0± + "it. Age, age squared, and family size growth are included in the regressions. Young is 25{45,
old is 50{65. The estimated coe±cients ^ ¯, ^ » and ^ ³ are reported. Serial correlation in the regression errors is corrected
using the Prais-Winsten transformation; robust standard errors in the regressions clustered by region. t-statistics in
parentheses. *** (**) [*] signi¯cant at the 1 (5) [10]% level.Table 3: Risk sharing regressions|Data. Different samples. Robustness
Owners Renters
Main speci¯cation
House price growth 0.133*** (5.79) 0.213*** (4.84)
Bad news {0.047*** ({4.66) {0.070*** ({4.10)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.184*** (2.62) 0.012 (0.11)
No. of obs. 19,234 8,778
SEO sample
House price growth 0.204*** (4.61) 0.241*** (4.00)
Bad news {0.039** ({2.08) {0.078*** ({3.24)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.231* (1.94) {0.003 ({0.02)
No. of obs. 6,191 5,664
Core sample
House price growth 0.101*** (4.21) 0.162*** (2.67)
Bad news {0.049*** ({4.79) {0.037* ({1.69)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.162* (1.90) 0.015 (0.09)
No. of obs. 13,043 3,114
1980{1994: limiting condition only
House price growth 0.131*** (4.67) 0.208*** (4.03)
Bad news {0.032*** ({2.64) {0.064** ({2.51)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.317*** (3.46) {0.220 ({1.42)
No. of obs. 10,504 5,813
1994{2005: limiting condition only
House price growth 0.125*** (3.25) 0.274*** (4.13)
Bad news {0.054*** ({2.99) {0.060** ({2.14)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.330** (2.22) 0.016 (0.07)
No. of obs. 10,029 3,480
Imputed nondurables
House price growth 0.144*** (4.48) 0.251*** (4.07)
Bad news {0.050*** ({3.75) {0.062** ({2.42)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.174* (1.74) 0.098 (0.62)
No. of obs. 14,274 6,168
Controlling for income
Income growth 0.108*** (11.35) 0.186*** (12.81)
House price growth 0.117*** (5.52) 0.155*** (3.43)
Bad news {0.037*** ({3.57) {0.053*** ({3.04)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.172*** (2.60) 0.057 (0.51)
No. of obs. 18,449 8,230
Notes: See notes to Table 2.Table 4: Benchmark Calibration Parameters
Preferences
Cobb-Douglas utility; .205 weight for housing.
Discount rate 3.45%; curvature of utility 2.
Demographics
One period is two years.
Households are born at 24, retire at 66 and die at 84 the latest.
Mortality shocks: U.S. vital statistics (females), 2003.
Income
Overall variance of permanent (transitory) shocks 0.01 (.073).
Displacement: Perm. shock: probability 3%; income loss 25 (40)% for young (old).
Transitory shock: probability 5%; income loss 40%.
Jointly match s.d. of \bad news" in the PSID.
Pension: 50% of last working period permanent income.
Interest rates
4% for deposits; 4.5% for mortgages.
No uncertainty.
Housing Market
Down payment 20%; buying (selling) cost 2% (6%).
Taxes
Proportional taxation.
Income tax rate 20% (TAXSIM); mortgage interest fully deductible.
House Prices
Average real appreciation 0; variance 0.0131.
Housing depreciation 1.5%.
Rent-to-price ratio 5.7%.
Moving de¯ned as increasing or decreasing housing services more than 5%.
Moving shocks
1.5% probability when working-age; to match moving rates in PSID.
Other
No income and house-price correlation.
No bequest motive but accidental bequests.
25Table 5: Risk sharing regressions{Model. Alternative Calibrations
Owner Renter
Baseline (70% ownership)
House price growth 0.27*** (140.39) 0.01 (1.56)
Bad news {0.17*** ({120.89) {0.21*** ({69.05)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.08*** (16.69) {0.01 ({0.91)
No. of obs. 151,150 62,126
Ownership not allowed (0% ownership)
House price growth 0.00 (1.61)
Bad news {0.17*** ({131.54)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.00 (0.39)
No. of obs. 254,593
No downpayment (72% ownership)
House price growth 0.28*** (121.47) 0.01** (2.41)
Bad news {0.17*** ({150.06) {0.21*** ({76.75)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.09*** (19.87) {0.02 ({1.55)
No. of obs. 146,289 66,021
No adj. cost (90% ownership)
House price growth 0.25*** (162.12) 0.03** (2.54)
Bad news {0.16*** ({125.98) {0.34*** ({32.91)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.06*** (14.56) {0.10*** ({3.17)
No. of obs. 221,600 7,154
No dowpayment, adj. cost or min. house size (100% ownership)
House price growth 0.23*** (147.41)
Bad news {0.17*** ({81.62)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.11*** (16.98)
No. of obs. 254,593
100% downpayment (60% ownership) ]
House price growth 0.16*** (60.14) {0.00 ({0.02)
Bad news {0.19*** ({115.31) {0.23*** ({99.23)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.05*** (7.91) 0.01 (0.89)
No. of obs. 142,000 82,819
Income/house price correlation (70% ownership)z
House price growth 0.39*** (219.91) 0.20*** (51.93)
Bad news {0.17*** ({131.59) {0.21*** ({80.83)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.06*** (14.24) {0.01 ({1.17)
No. of obs. 156,217 62,983
Notes: The regression cit ¡ ¹ ct = ¹ + ¯ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + » (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) + ³ (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) +
(Xit ¡ ¹ Xt)0± +"it is estimated. Age and age squared are included in the regressions. The estimated
coe±cients ^ ¯, ^ » and ^ ³ are reported. ] house size restriction eliminated to increase homeownership.
z recalibrated to match the same targets as in the benchmark. Serial correlation in the regression
errors is corrected using the Prais-Winsten transformation; robust standard errors in the regressions
clustered by region. t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) [*] signi¯cant at the 1 (5) [10]% level.Table 6: Risk sharing regressions{Model. Different Splits
Owner Renter
Baseline
House price growth 0.27*** (140.39) 0.01 (1.56)
Bad news {0.17*** ({120.89) {0.21*** ({69.05)
Bad news £ House price gr. 0.08*** (16.69) {0.01 ({0.91)
No. of obs. 151,150 62,126
Non-movers
House price growth 0.34*** (52.56) 0.01 (1.56)
Bad news {0.15*** ({97.43) {0.21*** ({69.05)
Bad news £ House price gr. 0.10*** (18.14) {0.01 ({0.91)
No. of obs. 121,970 62,126
Young
House price growth 0.25*** (65.79) 0.00 (1.13)
Bad news {0.14*** ({49.70) {0.25*** ({69.18)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.05*** (6.08) {0.01 ({0.98)
No. of obs. 30,451 40,425
Old
House price growth 0.29*** (152.53) 0.03** (2.59)
Bad news {0.19*** ({84.34) {0.11*** ({28.37)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.11*** (13.69) 0.04*** (3.11)
No. of obs. 73,829 5,897
Poor
House price growth 0.37*** (41.82) 0.01 (1.20)
Bad news {0.20*** ({29.44) {0.18*** ({52.80)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.17*** (7.03) {0.00 ({0.38)
No. of obs. 6,337 37,199
Rich
House price growth 0.25*** (157.24) 0.02 (0.47)
Bad news {0.15*** ({53.73) {0.10*** ({3.28)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.06*** (5.92) {0.11 ({1.41)
No. of obs. 50,009 247
Controlling for current income
Income growth 0.12*** (158.59) 0.30*** (186.42)
House price growth 0.27*** (180.72) 0.01 (1.60)
Bad news {0.10*** ({82.99) {0.08*** ({36.33)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.07*** (17.32) {0.02** ({2.10)
No. of obs. 151,150 62,126
Notes: The estimated regression is cit¡¹ ct = ¹+¯ (hpmt¡hpt)+» (Dit¡ ¹ Dt)+³ (Dit¡ ¹ Dt)£(hpmt¡hpt)+
(Xit ¡ ¹ Xt)0± +"it. Age and age squared are included in the regressions. The estimated coe±cients ^ ¯, ^ », and
^ ³ are reported. Young is 28{45, old is 50{64. Poor (Rich) is below (above) the 25 (75)-th percentile of net
worth in the initial period. Serial correlation in the regression errors is corrected using the Prais-Winsten
transformation; robust standard errors in the regressions clustered by region. t-statistics in parentheses. ***
(**) [*] signi¯cant at the 1 (5) [10]% level.Appendices (not for publication)
Appendix A Risk Sharing with housing. Derivation
of equation (1)
Consider an endowment economy with nondurable and housing goods, C and H respec-
tively. Each time a stochastic event st is drawn from the state space S. The probability of
drawing a sequence of states st = (s1;::: ;st) is denoted as ¼(st). Individual endowments
of housing services and nondurable consumption goods at time t depend on st.
Consider the Pareto problem where a social planner maximizes the discounted utility






























t) for all t;s
t; (A-3)
where !i is the planner's weight attached to individual i's welfare and the weights sum
to one; ¯ is the time discount factor; C(st) is the aggregate endowment of nondurable
consumption goods at time t, history of events st; H(st) is the aggregate endowment
of housing services at time t, history st; and ±i(st) is consumer i's shock to tastes over
consumption of nondurables and housing services at time t history of events st. Let the
instantaneous utility function be u(C;H) =
±i(C®H1¡®)1¡¾
1¡¾ . Denote the Lagrange multipli-
ers attached to the nondurables feasibility constraint as µ(st) and the housing feasibility
constraint as ¸(st). The maximization problem with respect to Ci(st) and Hi(st) yields

























Denoting a generic random variable x(st) as xt, it can be shown that the two equations
imply the following relationship for individual i's growth of nondurable consumption:Table 7: Housing equity splits. Owners only
Data Model
Young, low relative equity
House price growth 0.091** (2.46) 0.27*** (51.32)
Bad news {0.037* ({1.78) {0.15*** ({32.84)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.014 (0.09) 0.03 (1.60)
No. of obs. 4,966 9,319
Young, high relative equity
House price growth 0.137*** (2.96) 0.18*** (13.57)
Bad news {0.052** ({2.04) {0.13*** ({12.28)
Bad news £ house price gr. {0.027 ({0.18) 0.04 (1.15)
No. of obs. 3,256 4,039
Old, low relative equity
House price growth 0.087 (1.46) 0.24*** (69.06)
Bad news {0.046* ({1.96) {0.18*** ({39.32)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.257* (1.79) 0.12*** (7.33)
No. of obs. 2,654 19,120
Old, high relative equity
House price growth 0.103*** (3.15) 0.30*** (56.22)
Bad news {0.063*** ({3.60) {0.21*** ({53.52)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.391*** (2.81) 0.16*** (10.47)
No. of obs. 4,662 29,288
Notes: Sample is restricted to owners de¯ned as follows. Owners are households who continuously owned a
house between years t and t¡4, resided in the same MSA, and did not change family composition during that
time span. \Low (high) relative equity" owners are those whose lagged housing equity to consumption ratio
is below (equal to or above) the 50th percentile of the annual distribution of the ratio. The denominator of
the ratio at time t is the average of consumption in periods t ¡ 8, t ¡ 7, :::, t ¡ 4. Young is 28{45, old is
50{64. Robust standard errors in the regressions clustered by the MSA where the household lives between
years t and t ¡ 4. t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) [*] signi¯cant at the 1 (5) [10]% level.
29¢logCit =
1
1 + ° + Á
[¡Á¢logµ
0
t + (1 + Á)¢log¸
0
t ¡ ¢log±it ¡ log¯] + ²it; (A-6)
where ° ´ ®(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1, Á ´ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1, and ²it is individual i's measurement
error in nondurable consumption growth.
In our empirical analysis, we consider four-year di®erences de¯ned as cit ´ logCit ¡
logCit¡4 =
P3
j=0 ¢logCit¡j. Equation (A-6) can be rewritten as:
cit =
1
1 + ° + Á
h
¡Á~ µt + (1 + Á)~ ¸t ¡ ~ ±it ¡ ~ ¯
i
+ ~ ²it; (A-7)
where ~ µt =
P3
j=0 ¢logµ0
t¡j; ~ ¸t =
P3
j=0 ¢log¸0
t¡j; ~ ±it =
P3




Subtracting nationwide consumption growth, ¹ ct, from idiosyncratic consumption growth,
we obtain:
cit ¡ ct = uit; (A-8)
where uit = ~ ²it + 1
1+°+Á
³
~ ±t ¡ ~ ±it
´
, ¹ ct, and ~ ±t are the nationwide averages of nondurable
consumption growth and taste shocks.
Equation (A-8) says that any idiosyncratic variable, Dit, net of the nationwide av-
erage (and its interaction with any aggregate variable, say, regional house-price growth)
independent of taste shocks and measurement error in nondurable consumption growth
should not enter signi¯cantly in a regression of the form:
cit ¡ ¹ ct =¹ + ¯ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + » (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt)
+ ³ (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + (Xit ¡ ¹ Xt)
0± + "it ; (A-9)
where hpmt denotes house-price growth in the region of household i's residence m. The full
risk-sharing allocation of housing services and nondurable consumption therefore implies
testing the null that ¯, », and ³ are all equal to zero.
If nondurable consumption can be fully shared nationally across N agents but housing
services can be freely transferred only within regions, the feasibility constraint for housing





t) for all t;s
t; (A-10)
where Nm is the number of households residing in region m. Hm(st) is the aggregate stock
30of housing services in region m at time t history of events st, and Him(st) is individual
i's endowment of housing services at time t history st residing in region m. Denote the
Lagrange multiplier attached to the housing feasibility constraint in region m at time t
history of events st as ¸m(st). In this case, equation (A-6) becomes:
¢logCit =
1
1 + ° + Á
[¡Á¢logµ
0
t + (1 + Á)¢log¸
0
mt ¡ ¢log±it ¡ log¯] + ²it:
(A-11)
Subtracting the nationwide average of nondurable consumption growth over the four-
year interval from idiosyncratic consumption growth, we obtain:
cit ¡ ct =
1 + Á
1 + ° + Á
³
~ ¸mt ¡ ~ ¸t
´
+ uit; (A-12)
where uit = ²it + 1
1+°+Á
³
~ ±t ¡ ~ ±it
´
, and ~ ¸mt =
P3
j=0 ¢log¸0
mt¡j and ~ ¸t is the nationwide
average of ~ ¸mt. In this situation, consumption growth is higher if the housing constraint
in the region of agent i tightens|implying an increasing value of the Lagrange multiplier.
In a decentralized competitive equilibrium with Arrow-Debreu securities for non-
durable consumption and housing services, ¸0
mt will be related to the regional price of
housing services in terms of nondurable consumption goods.32 Equation (A-12) suggests
that any idiosyncratic variable Dit net of the nationwide average (as well as its interaction
with the regional house-price growth net of aggregate house-price growth) independent of
taste shocks and measurement error in nondurable consumption growth should not enter
signi¯cantly the regression (A-9). Under the null of full risk sharing of housing services
and nondurable consumption ¯, », and ³ are all equal to zero, while under the null of
full risk sharing of nondurable consumption but regional risk sharing of housing services
» and ³ are equal to zero while ¯ is not equal to zero.
Appendix B Data
The PSID started in 1968 with a representative sample of about 3,000 households (the core
sample) and a sample of low-income households (the SEO sample) that comprised about
2,000 families. In 1990 the PSID added the Latino sample and in 1997|the Immigrant
sample. The PSID follows families over time, including young adults as they split o® from
the original family units. We use the core and SEO samples in our analysis, dropping the
32It can be shown that a decentralized competitive equilibrium with time-0 Arrow-Debreu claims to
nondurable consumption and housing services is a particular Pareto optimal allocation with q0(st) =
µ(st), and hp0
m(st) = ¸m(st) where q0(st) is the time 0 Arrow-Debreu price of one unit of nondurable
consumption in terms of time 0 nondurable goods to be delivered if state st is realized at time t, and
hpm(st) is the time 0 price of one unit of housing services in terms of time 0 nondurable goods to be
delivered if state st is realized at time t.
31Latino and Immigrant samples. In 1997, the PSID changed from interviewing annually
to interviewing biennially.
Our sample selection is as follows. We start with the individual ¯le that contains
information on age, sex, education, employment and headship status, and individual year
of birth for years 1968{2007. We drop those who are never heads of household during
the survey years. Individual age is reported with noise in the PSID: ¯rst, interviews may
be conducted in di®erent months of a year and, as a result, age may change or jump by
more than one year in consecutive surveys; second, age can be recorded with error by
interviewers. We utilize the data on year of birth from the individual ¯le to construct a
cleaner measure of age: age is de¯ned as the di®erence between the survey year and year
of birth. For those heads with no information on year of birth, we utilize the ¯rst record
on age when an individual becomes a head to construct a consistent age series.
We further add the data on marital status, family composition change, family size,
head's and wife's labor and transfer income, displacement and disability status, home-
ownership status, moving, self-reported house value and food from the family ¯les of the
PSID. We keep households whose heads are of ages 25 to 65, drop those with no in-
formation on food at home, homeownership status, and region of residence during the
survey years. In the PSID, a small number of households report being neither owners nor
renters in any survey year. We label those households owners if they report a positive
house value; otherwise, we label them renters. Our results are robust to dropping those
households. We set homeownership status to missing if households report being owners
and zero house value. We also set top-coded observations on income, house value, food
at home, food away, and family size to missing.
Food consumption consists of food consumed at home and away from home (excluding
food purchased at work or school). The PSID reported annual food costs until 1993, but
has reported costs at the daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly, or annual frequency since 1994.
For the years 1994{2005, we use household food consumption reported at the monthly or
weekly frequency and convert those records to annual amounts.33 For household income,
the sum of real labor and transfer income of head and wife before taxes is used. Food
consumption at home and away from home and household income are de°ated by the
all-items-less-housing consumer price index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The timing of several variables is not fully synchronized. For example, the income
record in a survey year t refers to income earned in period t ¡ 1|the same holds for
displacement status. Since most households are interviewed in the ¯rst quarter of the
year, we assume that food consumption and limiting status records in a survey year
t refer to the food consumption and limiting status e®ective in period t ¡ 1. Similarly,
demographic variables such as age and family size are assumed to correspond to the head's
age and family size in period t ¡ 1.34 The house-price index in year t is the house-price
index for the previous year.
Further sample selection criteria are as follows. For each year, observations with
33We lose a low number of observations for households reporting food consumption at other frequencies.
We do not include them in our sample because some, when converted to annual amounts, are clear outliers.
34This is necessary to enable us to keep observations after 1997, when the PSID switched to biennial
data collection.
32zero or missing records of food consumption at home are dropped. To hedge against
outliers, observations above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile of the annual
food-at-home distributions are dropped and records of food away from home above the
99th percentile of each annual distribution are set to missing.35 We then add up real
food at home and food away from home to obtain a measure of total food consumption.
We drop observations with a ratio of total food consumption to income above the 99th
percentile or below the 1st percentile of the annual distributions for the ratio. We also
drop observations above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile of the four-year
consumption growth distributions. We restrict our analysis to family-year pairs with
stable composition (same head and wife during the four-year span) and families for which
we have information on housing status. The sample is also restricted to households that
reside in the same metropolitan area during a given four-year period so four-year MSA
house-price changes can be meaningfully assigned.
Appendix C House-price appreciation across MSAs
Figure A-1 shows the distribution of real house-price appreciation (four-year growth rates
to match our empirical speci¯cation) over the period. As is evident from the distribution,
our sample includes both house-price appreciation and house-price depreciation episodes.
Figure A-2, panel (a) reveals signi¯cant cross-sectional variation of house-prices while
panel (b) shows a clear di®erence in the intertemporal patterns of house-price appreciation
for selected MSAs. Overall, this ¯gure demonstrates the large variation in the panel of
house prices which allows us to obtain statistically signi¯cant estimates of their impact
on nondurable consumption.
Appendix D The Household Problem and Calibra-
tion
The household problem
















Ct ¸ 0; Ft ¸ 0; Ht ¸ 0; At ¸ 0; Mt ¸ 0; xt 2 f0;1g; zt 2 f0;1g; 8t = 0;:::;T;
(D-2)
35We do not drop observations with zero records of food away from home. In the Consumer Expendi-
tures Survey, which provides reliable information on the spending patterns of U.S. consumers, virtually
everyone reports non-zero records of food at home, while a substantial fraction of respondents reports
zero expenditures on food away from home (excluding food at work).
33Ct + (1 ¡ xt)r
f
t Ft + At ¡ Mt + xt (1 + I ·)qtHt + xt¡1I Âqt(1 ¡ ±h)Ht¡1 + ¿yY
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t ·
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t = Wt + r
a At¡1 ¡ ¿m r
m Mt¡1; 8t = 0;:::;T; (D-5)
Mt · (1 ¡ µ)qtHt or
Mt < Mt¡1 if Mt > (1 ¡ µ)qtHt and (jHt=Ht¡1 ¡ 1j < 0:05;zt = 0);
8t = 0;:::;T ¡ 1; MT = 0; (D-6)
qt+1 = (1 + %t+1)qt; 8t = 0;:::;T: (D-7)
Equation (D-2) contains non-negativity constraints, and states that households cannot
be renters and homeowners at the same time (xt is an indicator of ownership in period t
and Ft are housing services acquired through the rental market), and face moving shocks.
Equation (D-3) is the budget constraint, where I is an indicator function equal to 1 if
the household is moving and 0 otherwise. Equation (D-4) describes labor income for
working-age households, and the pension bene¯t for retirees. Equation (D-5) spells out
taxable income. Equation (D-6) is the collateralized debt constraint, which says that
the maximum loan-to-value ratio for new mortgages and equity lines of credit is 1 ¡ µ,
allowing for an exception for non-movers (when prices go down) who can simply pay their
mortgage. Finally, equation (D-7) captures the dynamics of housing prices.
Under these assumptions, households prefer equity to debt ¯nancing of their houses
(i.e., they pay their mortgages before accumulating deposits), as long as the after-tax rate
on mortgages, (1 ¡ ¿m¿y)rm, is higher than the after-tax return on deposits, (1 ¡ ¿y)ra.
For details on the solution method, see D¶ ³az and Luengo-Prado (2010).
Calibration Details
Preferences, endowments and demography
For computational reasons, one period is two years. Households are born at age 24
(t = 1), and die at the maximum age of 85 (t = 31). The retirement age is 66 (t = 22).
Survival probabilities are taken from the latest U.S. Vital Statistics (for females in 2003),
published by the National Center for Health Statistics. The implied fraction of working-
age households is 75.6 percent|slightly lower than the fraction in the PSID, 78.6 percent.
Most parameters are quoted in annual terms, but are adjusted to a biennial frequency in
34our computations.
For preferences regarding consumption of nondurable goods and housing services, we





The curvature of the utility function is ¾ = 2.
We follow Cocco et al. (2005) in our labor earnings calibration. Using data from the
PSID, those authors estimate the life-cycle pro¯le of income, as well as the variance of
permanent and transitory shocks for three di®erent educational groups: no high school,
high school, and college. We choose these authors' estimates of the variance of per-
manent and transitory shocks for households whose head has a high school degree|the
typical median household (0:01, and 0:073, respectively). These values are typical in the
literature|Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004). For consistency, we also use the esti-
mated growth rate of the non-stochastic life-cycle component of earnings for a household
with a high school degree from Cocco et al. (2005).
To calibrate the displacement shock, we follow the evidence in Stephens (2001). The
literature on job displacement ¯nds that annual earnings fall 25{40 percent in the year of
displacement, while earnings fall by roughly 15 percent after a disability shock. Annual
earnings are well below expected levels six years after the initial shock in both cases. We
model displacement as a combination of permanent and transitory shocks. We set the
income loss from the permanent shock to the lower end of his ¯ndings for the young, 25
percent, and to the upper end, 40 percent, for the old (young is under 46, old is 46-64 so
¸young=0.75 and ¸old=0.60). The probability of the permanent displacement shock is 3
percent, a bit below the 5{15 percent found using datasets such as the PSID. (Numbers
vary depending on the speci¯c de¯nitions of displacement and disability.) Cocco et al.
(2005) do not allow for a displacement shock, so ¾2
" is adjusted so that the overall variance
of the permanent shocks inclusive of this bad shock is equal to their estimate, 0.01. The
transitory displacement shock is calibrated to produce a loss of income of 40 percent
for just one period with a 5 percent probability. As with the permanent shocks, ¾2
º is
adjusted so that the overall variance of the transitory shocks is 0.073 as in Cocco et al.
(2005). This combination of permanent and transitory bad shocks reproduces the mean
and standard deviation of the bad news variable constructed from PSID data and used
in our regressions. In our model, retirees face no income uncertainty. Their pension is
set at 50 percent of permanent income in the last period of working life. That ¯gure is
between the 42 percent estimated in Munnell and Soto (2005) as the median replacement
rate for newly retired workers, according to both the Health Retirement Survey and Social
Security Administration data, and the 68 percent in Cocco et al. (2005), calculated as a
ratio of average income for retirees and average income in the last working year before
retirement (PSID data). The moving shock is calibrated to match the four-year moving
rate for owners in PSID data which is 19 percent. We need an annual moving probability
of 1.5 percent to get this rate in our model. Only working-age individuals are a®ected by
the moving shock.
35In our setup, there is no age limit on credit availability and, in the event of death,
houses are liquidated at the price in the previous period to avoid most negative accidental
bequests. A negative bequest is still possible for a homeowner who dies at a young age
after a period of house-price depreciation. We assume the government takes the loss in
this case.
Market arrangements
The minimum down payment is 20 percent, slightly below the 25 percent average down
payment for the period 1963{2001 reported by the Federal Housing Finance Board. We
set the selling cost equal to 6 percent, a typical realtor fee, and the buying cost to 2
percent. The interest rate on deposits, ra, is set to 4 percent in annual terms (the average
real rate for 1967{2005, as calculated in D¶ ³az and Luengo-Prado 2010), while the interest
rate on mortgages is set to 4.5 percent.
Taxes
To calibrate the income tax rate, ¿y, we use data on personal income and personal taxes
from the National Income and Product Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
as well as information from TAXSIM, the NBER tax calculator.36 For the period 1989{
2004, personal taxes represent 12.47 percent of personal income in NIPA. As in Prescott
(2004), we multiply this number by 1.6 to re°ect the fact that marginal income tax rates
are usually higher than average rates. The 1.6 number is the mean ratio of marginal
income tax rates to average tax rates, based on TAXSIM (for details, see Feenberg and
Coutts 1993). The ¯nal number is 19.96 percent, which we approximate using ¿y = 0:20.
We assume mortgage payments are fully deductible, ¿m = 1.
House prices
Housing prices follow the process qt = qt¡1(1 + %t), where %t » N(¹%;¾2
%). ¹% = 0
and ¾2
% = :0132|as in Li and Yao (2007). We assume %t is serially uncorrelated and
uncorrelated with the income shocks. The housing depreciation/maintenance cost rate,
±h, is set to 1.5 percent, as estimated in Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2007).












(1 ¡ ¿y)ra + ±h
(1 ¡ ¿y)(1 + (1 ¡ ¿y)ra)
; (D-9)
which can be interpreted as the user cost for a landlord who is not liquidity constrained,
not subject to adjustment costs, and who pays income taxes on rental income. This
calibration choice is consistent with the estimates in Sinai and Souleles (2005), who ¯nd
the house-price-to-rent ratio capitalizes expected future rents, as any other asset (for more
details see D¶ ³az and Luengo-Prado 2010). For our benchmark calibration, r
f
t =qt is roughly
5.7 percent annually.
36The TAXSIM data is available at http://www.nber.org/taxsim.
36Patterns of homeownership and wealth
Figure A-3 depicts the evolution of some key variables throughout the life cycle in our
baseline calibration. All series are normalized by mean earnings. Panel (a) shows mean
labor income (earnings for workers and pensions for retirees) and nondurable consumption.
For working-age households, the life-cycle pro¯le for earnings is calibrated to the pro¯le
estimated by Cocco et al. (2005) for households with a high school degree. Earnings
peak at age 47. For retirees, the pension-replacement ratio is calibrated to be 50 percent
of permanent earnings in the last working period. Our model produces a hump-shaped
nondurable consumption pro¯le with a peak around age 60.
Panel (b) in Figure A-3 depicts mean wealth and its di®erent components throughout
the life cycle. Total wealth is hump-shaped and peaks at ages 60{63, with a value about
2.96 times mean earnings in the economy, declining rapidly afterward. Because we do
not allow for altruism in the model, total wealth is zero for those who reach the oldest-
possible age (not depicted). Housing wealth (including collateralized debt) increases until
age 52{55, then stays fairly constant until it begins to decrease at age 72, when the
homeownership rate starts to decline. Financial assets become negative at age 72 as
retirees take advantage of reverse mortgages.
The targets of our calibration are the overall homeownership rate in the United States,
the median wealth-to-earnings ratio for working-age households, and the median ratio of
house value to total wealth for homeowners. Figure A-4 plots the life-cycle patterns
of these three variables against the data.37 The median wealth-to-earnings ratio in the
model|see panel (a)|follows the ratio in the data very closely until age 59, and diverges
signi¯cantly thereafter, probably because we are not allowing for heterogeneity in retire-
ment ages. In our model, gross housing wealth is a higher (lower) fraction of total wealth
than in the data for the oldest (youngest) cohorts. The fact that we are abstracting from
intergenerational altruism (that is, older cohorts exhaust their assets as they age) may
account for the divergence for the oldest households. Other possibilities are limited avail-
ability of reverse mortgages in real life or uncertainty about health expenses in old age
which may result in higher liquid savings. The timing of accidental bequests (received
early in life in the form of liquid wealth) could explain the divergence for the youngest
cohorts.
Panel (b) in Figure A-4 depicts the life-cycle pro¯le of homeownership rates in our
benchmark calibration and in the data. Although we can reproduce the average U.S.
homeownership rate, our model underestimates homeownership for ages 24 to 40, and
overestimates homeownership rates for older cohorts, with the exception of the oldest. In
our benchmark calibration, the oldest cohort turns to renting in the last period of life in
order to free up forced housing equity.
It seems we would need further heterogeneity and/or additional assumptions to exactly
replicate homeownership patterns and other pro¯les by age. However, this is not the focus
of our paper. Our aim is to determine if our empirical ¯ndings are consistent with a story
in which housing equity is used to alleviate liquidity constraints. To this end, we study
37We use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (averages from 1989 to 2004) instead of the PSID
for these graphs, because the SCF has somewhat better information on wealth and the sample sizes are
larger.
37the quantitative predictions of this model (with the key features of endogenous tenure
choice and a collateral role for housing) regarding the e®ect of house-price changes on risk
sharing.
Appendix E Alternative model speci¯cations
Correlation between income shocks and house-price shocks
To allow for a possible correlation between income shocks and house-price shocks, we
modify the income process by introducing a regional permanent shock, gt, common to







calibrate ¾g, we use the evidence in Luengo-Prado and S¿rensen (2008). We save on
state variables by assuming that the regional income shock and the house-price shock
are perfectly correlated. This case can be seen as the opposite extreme from our base-
line calibration in terms of income/house-price correlation. With this correlation, young
households delay homeownership and the overall homeownership would be lower if the
model was not recalibrated to match the same aggregates. See Figure A-5.
A bequest motive











where b measures the strength of the bequest motive, and terminal wealth equals the
value of the housing stock, after depreciation takes place and adjustment costs are paid,
plus ¯nancial assets: Xt = qtHt(1 ¡ ±h)(1 ¡ Â) + At.
The Cobb-Douglas utility assumption we use as our benchmark would result in the
inheritor's expenditure on nondurable consumption, C, and housing services, r
f
t Ft, in
¯xed proportions ®=(1¡®). We consider bequests with and without correlation between
income and house-price shocks. In this case, we have one additional calibration parameter,
the strength of the bequest motive, so we add one additional target, the mean bequest-
to-income ratio, set to 2.5 consistent with the evidence in Hendricks (2001).
Adding a bequest motive changes the results just slightly from the baseline regression|
the direct e®ect of house prices is slightly larger re°ecting that homeowners hold on to
their house longer rather than selling it in order to spend down life-cycle savings late in
life (this makes the present value of adjustment costs lower)|see Figure A-5, panel (b)
and Table A-4. One important di®erence is a signi¯cantly lower MPC out of income
for renters when a bequest motive is at play. This is intuitive because, in the absence
of a bequest motive, poor consumers (typically renters) would spend a higher fraction
of increases in income. Importantly, our house-price interaction terms are consistently
signi¯cant for owners, with a sign indicating risk sharing, while that is not the case for
renters.
38CES utility
We report results for a di®erent utility function. In particular, we use the ¯ndings
in Li et al. (2009) and consider a CES utility function with an intra-temporal elasticity
of substitution between housing and nondurable consumption of 0.33 (i.e., housing and
nondurables are complements).
In this case, the expenditure shares on housing and nondurables for renters are not
independent of the relative price of the two goods, as in the Cobb-Douglas case. The
parameter that controls the expenditure share on housing and nondurables, the discount
rate, and the minimum house size are recalibrated to reproduce the same homeownership
rate, wealth-to-income ratio, and ratio of house value to total wealth as in the case with
a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The estimated coe±cients using our simulated data are
not very sensitive to this change. Most importantly, the house-price interaction term is
positively signi¯cant for owners, indicating additional risk sharing, and not for renters|
see Table A-4.
Appendix F Robustness to sampling frequency
We explore robustness of our results to the sampling frequency and report results in
Table A-5. In the data, we ¯nd a somewhat stronger direct e®ect of house prices at
the two-year frequency|especially for renters|and insigni¯cant interaction terms. At
longer frequencies the direct e®ect of house prices is fairly stable for owners and less so for
renters although the e®ect remains signi¯cant. The direct e®ect of bad news does not vary
much with the frequency indicating that disability and displacement indeed are persistent
events. The interaction term is signi¯cant for 3-year and 6-year frequencies reaching its
highest level of signi¯cance at the four-year frequency, the baseline. Our prior was that
low frequencies would have low signal to noise ratios and the results bear this out but are
otherwise robust.
In the model, results are fairly robust to the sampling frequency except for the interac-
tion term which becomes smaller as the sampling frequency increases. At long frequencies,
people may be more likely to move anyway making the interaction e®ect smaller|the di-
rect e®ects do not change with the sampling frequency as in the data.
39Table A-1: Summary Statistics of Empirical Data
Variable Mean SD Min Max
cit ¡ ¹ ct 0.00 0.46 {1.84 1.69
yit ¡ ¹ yt 0.00 0.42 {2.22 2.04
hpmt ¡ hpt 0.00 0.13 {0.57 0.55
Dit 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
(Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) 0.00 0.05 {0.47 0.46
Lit 0.02 0.28 {1.00 1.00
(Lit ¡ ¹ Lt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) 0.00 0.04 {0.55 0.55
BNit 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
(BNit ¡ BNt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) 0.00 0.05 {0.44 0.43
Owner 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
Age 45.18 9.95 29.00 65.00
Notes: Variable de¯nitions as follows: cit is the (four-year) log di®erence of consumption
for individual i in year t, yit is the log di®erence of current income, and ¹ ct (¹ yt) is the mean
log consumption (income) di®erence in period t. hpmt is the log di®erence in house prices
in the region where individual i lives, while hpt is the mean log di®erence in house prices for
all regions in period t. Dit is the displacement shock indicator; Lit is the limiting condition
indicator; and BNit is the \bad news" indicator.
40Table A-2: Summary Statistics of Simulated Data
Variable Mean SD Min Max
cit ¡ ¹ ct 0.00 0.22 {1.31 1.66
yit ¡ ¹ yt 0.00 0.58 {2.97 2.01
hpmt ¡ hpt 0.00 0.29 {0.37 0.35
Dit 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
(Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) 0.00 0.10 {0.31 0.30
Owner 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Age 45.65 11.07 28 64
Notes: Variable de¯nitions as follows: cit is the (four-year) log di®erence of consumption
for individual i in year t, yit (pit) is the log di®erence of current (permanent) income, and
¹ ct (¹ yt; ¹ pt) is the mean log consumption (income) di®erence in period t. hpmt is the log
di®erence in house prices in the region where individual i lives, while hpt is the mean log
di®erence in house prices for all regions in period t. Dit is the displacement shock indicator.
41Table A-3: IV Regression of Food on Nondurable Expenditures. CEX Data:
1980{2002
Log nondurable cons. 0.730*** Log nondurable cons. £ HS 0.023
(15.84) (1.03)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1980 0.122*** Log nondurable cons. £ coll. 0.089***
(9.45) (3.72)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1981 0.103*** Log regional food CPI 0.643***
(9.09) (3.88)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1982 0.094*** Log regional fuel-util. CPI {0.113***
(8.87) ({2.75)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1983 0.089*** White 0.047***
(8.78) (6.91)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1984 0.083*** Family size 0.055***
(8.77) (17.34)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1985 0.081*** High school {0.252
(8.97) ({1.22)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1986 0.076*** College {0.924***
(8.95) ({4.10)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1987 0.070*** Male head 0.082***
(9.03) (15.41)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1988 0.067*** Married {0.030**
(9.55) ({2.42)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1989 0.061*** Age 0.012***
(10.07) (4.49)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1990 0.051*** Age sq./100 {0.011***
(10.05) ({4.13)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1991 0.043*** Born 1924{1932 {0.017*
(9.51) ({1.67)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1992 0.041*** Born 1933{1941 {0.012
(9.56) ({0.90)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1993 0.038*** Born 1942{1950 {0.004
(9.52) ({0.24)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1994 0.034*** Born 1951{1959 0.001
(9.64) (0.06)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1995 0.030*** Born 1960{1968 0.019
(9.51) (0.80)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1996 0.023*** Born 1969{1978 0.029
(8.92) (1.02)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1997 0.020*** Northeast {0.013**
(9.47) ({2.33)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1998 0.017*** Midwest {0.061***
(9.64) ({11.48)
Log nondurable cons. £ 1999 0.013*** South {0.037***
(8.57) ({7.06)
Log nondurable cons. £ 2000 0.011*** Constant 0.085
(9.59) (0.24)
Log nondurable cons. £ 2001 0.006*** Adj. R sq. 0.721
(7.58)
N 40,630 F 1264.1
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Instruments for log nondurable consumption (and its interaction with year and
education dummies) are the averages of log head's wages speci¯c to cohort, education, and head's sex in a given year
(and their interactions with year and education dummies). *** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5%
level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.Table A-4: Risk sharing regressions{Model. Alternative Calibrations
Owner Renter
Baseline
Income growth 0.12*** (158.59) 0.30*** (186.42)
House price growth 0.27*** (180.72) 0.01 (1.60)
Bad news {0.10*** ({82.99) {0.08*** ({36.33)
Bad news £ House price gr. 0.07*** (17.32) {0.02** ({2.10)
No. of obs. 151,150 62,126
Bequest motive
Income growth 0.12*** (188.10) 0.21*** (188.35)
House price growth 0.29*** (169.01) 0.01** (2.68)
Bad news {0.10*** ({82.72) {0.09*** ({46.63)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.08*** (19.62) {0.00 ({0.28)
No. of obs. 142,923 66,002
Bequest and income/house price correlation
Income growth 0.12*** (170.73) 0.20*** (141.65)
House price growth 0.39*** (301.98) 0.14*** (54.28)
Bad news {0.10*** ({77.24) {0.09*** ({45.77)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.06*** (15.34) {0.00 ({0.60)
No. of obs. 140,264 73,633
CES utility
Income growth 0.10*** (87.48) 0.31*** (177.74)
House price growth 0.28*** (146.37) 0.01 (1.33)
Bad news {0.10*** ({88.93) {0.08*** ({30.07)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.06*** (18.04) {0.02*** ({2.89)
No. of obs. 151,866 53,955
Notes: We run the following regression: cit ¡ ¹ ct = ¹ + ¯ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + » (Dit ¡ ¹ Dt) + ³ (Dit ¡
¹ Dt) £ (hpmt ¡ hpt) + (Xit ¡ ¹ Xt)0± + ®(yit ¡ ¹ yt)"it. We report the estimated coe±cients ^ ®, ^ ¯, ^ »,
and ^ ³. We control for age and age sq. in the regressions. All models recalibrated to match the
same targets as benchmark. Serial correlation in the regression errors is corrected using the Prais-
Winsten transformation; robust standard errors in the regressions clustered by region. t-statistics




House price growth 0.133*** (5.79) 0.213*** (4.84)
Bad news {0.047*** ({4.66) {0.070*** ({4.10)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.184*** (2.62) 0.012 (0.11)
No. of obs. 19,234 8,778
2-year frequency
House price growth 0.161*** (6.03) 0.204*** (3.63)
Bad news {0.036*** ({3.28) {0.052*** ({3.66)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.094 (0.98) 0.094 (0.52)
No. of obs. 26,676 14,856
3-year frequency
House price growth 0.134*** (5.09) 0.110* (1.87)
Bad news {0.040*** ({3.84) {0.082*** ({5.18)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.182*** (2.87) {0.077 ({0.61)
No. of obs. 18,254 9,935
6-year frequency
House price growth 0.127*** (4.82) 0.242*** (4.47)
Bad news {0.047*** ({4.26) {0.059*** ({3.47)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.116* (1.90) {0.029 ({0.30)
No. of obs. 13,806 5,627
Model
Baseline
House price growth 0.27*** (140.39) 0.01 (1.56)
Bad news {0.17*** ({120.89) {0.21*** ({69.05)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.08*** (16.69) {0.01 ({0.91)
No. of obs. 151,150 62,126
2-year frequency
House price growth 0.28*** (158.45) 0.01** (2.57)
Bad news {0.16*** ({146.20) {0.24*** ({77.83)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.14*** (18.24) {0.07*** ({3.13)
No. of obs. 151,150 62,126
6-year frequency
House price growth 0.27*** (147.14) 0.01* (1.72)
Bad news {0.16*** ({76.69) {0.18*** ({47.70)
Bad news £ house price gr. 0.06*** (11.36) {0.00 ({0.04)
No. of obs. 151,150 62,126
Notes: We run the following regression: cit¡¹ ct = ¹+¯ (hpmt¡hpt)+» (Dit¡ ¹ Dt)+³ (Dit¡ ¹ Dt)£
(hpmt ¡ hpt) + (Xit ¡ ¹ Xt)0± + "it. We report the estimated coe±cients ^ ¯, ^ », and ^ ³. We control for
age and age sq. (and family size growth in PSID data) in the regressions. Serial correlation in the
regression errors is corrected using the Prais-Winsten transformation; robust standard errors in the
regressions clustered by region. t-statistics in parentheses. ***(**)[*] signi¯cant at the 1(5)[10]%
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